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an alternate judgment is at once apparent. No doubt this common
law background extends a lingering influence over present-day
holdings under the statute." The cases are almost uniform in
holding that, where the litigated property is in the hands of the
losing party in the detinue action, an alternate judgment must be
rendered.' 2 But where the winner in detinue is entitled to only a
part of the value of the article by reason of a lien it is error to
award an alternate judgment.' 3 Likewise, the successful party
may waive his rights to have an alternate judgment pronounced
and may accept an award for the property only.14 Similarly,
where the winner in detinue is in possession when the verdict is
returned, omission of the alternate judgment for the value is immaterial or at least harmless error. 6 It would seem, therefore,
that affording complete protection for the successful party constitutes the essential reason for the alternate judgment and that the
reason ceasing, to that exent the rule should cease.
In the instant case, where the note was in the possession of
a third party, one advancing no claim thereon and being ready
to deliver the instrument according to the court's decision, there
would seem to be no reason for an alternate judgment and ample
reason for relaxing the strict requirement as to what constitutes
actual value in an action of detinue.
W. E. N.
PLEADING -

VALIDITY OF JUDGMENT ON NOTE AS

FAILURE TO ALLEGE

OR PROVE

RETuRN

OF

ArFECTED

NOTE FOR TAXATION.-

BY
X,

administrator, in a proceeding by notice of motion for judgment on
a note obtained judgment against petitioners for $850, to prevent
the enforcement of which, petitioners brought an original prohibition proceeding in the supreme court of appeals. A statute provided:
11 W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 55, art. 6.
1"White v. Emblem, 43 W. Va. 819, 28 S. E. 761 (1897) ; Graham v. Bright,

91 W. Va. 233, 112 S. E. 499 (1922) ; Stirling v. Garritee, 18 Md. 468 (1862);
Averett & Griffin v. Milner & Wilson, 75 Ala. 505 (1883).
13 Waddell v. Trowbridge, 94 W. Va. 482, 119 S. E. 290 (1923).
14 Malone v. Davis, 77 W. Va. 120, 86 S. E. 1100 (1915).
12 Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 214 Ala. 433, 108 So. 248
(1926); Gwin v. Emerald Co., 201 Ala. 384, 78 So. 758 (1918).
16 Dykes v. Clark, 98 Ala. 657, 13 So. 690 (1893); Scott v. Howard, 215
Ala. 590, 112 So. 194 (1927) ; Jones v. Pullen, 66 Ala. 306 (1880) ; Finney v.
Dryden, 214 Ala. 370, 108 So. 13 (1926); Shepherd v. Story, 62 Ala. 336

(1878).
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"In every action at law, proceeding or suit in equity ....
in a court of record.., for the collection of . . notes... the
plaintiff.. . shall be required to allege in his pleadings, or to
prove by affidavit or otherwise at any time before final
judgment or decree is entered:
That such . . . notes . . . have been assessed for
"(1)
taxation ... or
That such . . . notes ... constituted a part of the
"(2)
capital employed in the business of such plaintiff ... and were
assessed or taxed as such . . . or
That the plaintiff ... has not paid, or is unable to
"(3)
pay, the taxes . . . on such notes . . . but is willing for the
same to be paid out of his first recovery thereon, or
That such... notes... are not taxable ... , and no
"(4)
judgment or decree of a court of record rendered in any action,
suit or proceeding . . . , shall be valid unless the allegation
herein required was made, or unless the proof herein required
was adduced before final judgment or decree was entered.'
"When in any such action at law, suit in equity or proceeding, it is ascertained that there are unpaid taxes ... , and
the plaintiff ... makes it appear to the court that he has not
paid, or is unable to pay, said taxes ... but is willing for the
same to be paid out of his first recovery thereon, the court
may order, as part of any judgment or decree . . . that said
taxes ... shall be paid . . . out of the first collection on said
judgment or decree.'
The judgment itself did not show a compliance with any of
the alternative provisions of the statute. It is not expressly stated
but seems clear that the record failed to disclose such compliance.
Writ denied. Held, in an opinion by Judge Riley, that a judgment,
valid on its face, and rendered by a court of general jurisdiction,
having jurisdiction of both parties and subject matter, is not open
to such a collateral attack. Judge Fox, in a separate opinion, con3
curred in the result. Newhart v. Pennybacker, Judge.
The majority opinion seems to proceed upon the following considerations, among others: that the statute, new to our law, is
wholly procedural in its nature, and embraces no substantive right;
'It is to be noted that the statutory provision, while positive in terms, does
not require that anything appear in the record.
2 Only so much of the statute as may have a bearing upon the principal case
is set out. See W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art 4, § 71. The
statute was enacted during the second extraordinary session, 1933.
3 200 S. E. 350 (W. Va. 1938). The concurring opinion appears in 200 0,

E. 754.
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that it is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly
construed; that such construction must be made in the light of the
purpose behind the statute; that the purpose is not to do justice
between creditor and debtor, a purpose already adequately served
by the common law, but to provide the state with another means of
exacting taxes; that any construction making the statute a device
by which a debtor might escape payment of his just obligations
would lead to unfortunate consequences, and to absurdity; that
some reasonable construction, if available, should be adopted to
avoid such absurdity; that the statute, strictly construed, ought
not to make void, in a collateral proceeding, a judgment apparently
valid on its face.
While it concurs in this result, the separate opinion of Judge
Fox would seem to suggest that the language of the majority opinion is too broad, and that, without some qualification, this language
would be as applicable to a direct attack upon the judgment as to a
collateral one. He states his position thus: " . . . but I am unable
to agree that the statute in question cannot be used to avoid a
judgment secured in violation of its terms, merely because to do so
would permit the maker of a note to escape a just obligation. Such
a holding, in my judgment, practically nullifies the statute, for
there will be few instances where the rule announced cannot be
invoked. In my opinion, the statute is constitutional, and the fact
that its application may, in some instances, permit a debtor to
escape his obligation does nothing more than inflict the penalty
which the holder of an obligation incurs when, in violation of law,
he refuses to return the same for taxation." 4
The separate opinion would base the holding upon the ground
that jurisdiction of the court over parties and subject matter is not
questioned; that a presumption of validity attaches to the
judgment of a court of record, and that such judgment can be
avoided in a collateral attack only when lack of jurisdiction to
enter it affirmatively appears upon the record. It is suggested that
the statute ought not to be construed as depriving the court of
jurisdiction to enter judgment merely because certain facts are
required to appear to make the judgment valid; that this would
seem to be a matter of procedure, for the lack of compliance with
which, a writ of error would lie; that where no writ of error is
taken, the judgment, presumptively, should be valid and not open
4 Newhart v. Pennybacker, concurring opinion of Judge Fox, 200 S. E. 754.

at pages 754, 755,
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to collateral attack. It also is suggested that if the requirements of
the statute are procedural, as is held, then noncompliance is a defect in proof or procedure, and the remedy is by writ of error;
that if this remedy is not pursued, then, even direct attack by other
methods might be denied.
Whether reached through the approach used in the majority
opinion, or that adopted by Judge Fox, the result achieved would
seem to be the desirable one. Efforts, in recent years, have been
directed toward simplifying, pleading; but the tendency of the
statute in question is to complicate it, and to hinder the enforcement of lawful claims as a penalty for nonpayment of taxes thereon. Without doubt, the legislature can impose penalties for nonpayment of taxes. Legislatures of other states have enacted similar
statutes, variously phrased,5 and some of these achieve the object
of the West Virginia statute, without such unfortunate results as
those to which the latter, on its face, would seem to lead." The wisdom of such enactments, broadly, may not be a proper subject of
judicial inquiry, when their validity is concerned. But in questions
of interpretation and construction, the desirability of one possible
interpretation over another, appears to be a legitimate subject of inquiry. Particularly is this true when the matter under construction involves procedure, and possible interpretations interfere with
substantive rights.
It is said that the statute in question is in derogation of the
common law and should be strictly construed; but this ancient
5 For examples of such statutes, and the attitudes of the courts in dealing
with them see: Markwell v. Kahlkoff, 258 Ky. 231, 79 S. W. (2d) 984 (1935);
McLaughlin v. Cheney, 172 Okla. 562, 46 P. (2d) 352 (1935); Poss v. Albert,
139 Tenn. 1, 200 S. W. 976 (1917).
6 The Kentucky statute, considered in Markwell v. Kahlkoff, 258 Ky. 231,
79 S. W. (2d) 984 (1935), provided that failure to list a note for taxation
should be a bar to any action thereon, and could be pleaded as a complete
defense; but the holder might at any time be relieved from such defense by
paying the taxes. (It was there held that the statute was no defense to a
renewal note on which the taxes had been paid, though taxes on the note of
which it was a renewal had not been paid.)
The 1931 Oklahoma statute, construed in McLaughlin v. Cheney, 172 Okla.
562, 46 P. (2d) 352 (1935), provided that a note, not registered and taxed,
should not be competent as evidence in any court. (The court held that it was
harmless error to admit an untaxed note in evidence where there was other
evidence sufficient to sustain a judgment on the claim.)
The 1907 Tennessee statute, considered in Poss v. Albert, 139 Tenn. 1, 200
S. W. 976 (1917), provided that it could be shown in defense to an action on
an untaxed note, that it had not been returned for taxation, and that when
such "defense"
was established, the owner or holder should be taxed with
all the court costs, and the court, in giving judgment, should declare a lien in
favor of the state for unpaid taxes. (It was held that the statute did not
preclude recovery on a note not returned for taxation.)
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argument, the other extreme from which is that remedial statutes
should be liberally construed, scarcely is needed here. If the statute
can be regarded as remedial from the standpoint of the state in the
matter of taxation, it is in no wise remedial as between creditor
and debtor, or as applied to pleading. But this obviously is a penal
statute, and for that reason as well, ought to receive a strict construction.
It may be that, in supporting the result arrived at, the opinion
of Judge Fox proceeds upon the safer ground; but the view of
the majority opinion, confined to the facts, seems sound enough.
C. L. C.
WILLS

-

CONSTRUCTION

OF

CONTINGENT

LIMITATION-

"OR"

"AND".--TestatrLx devised property to her
husband for life, after his death to her daughter and the heirs of
her body forever. Should the daughter die before coming of age
or without heir or heirs of her body, then over to the children of
two cousins. The daughter died at the age of 59 without issue.
Held, that the word or must be construed and; and that the daughter became vested with a fee simple estate at age of twenty-one.
Jordan v. Jordan.'
CONSTRUED

TO MEAN

There is a long line of auhorities, both English2 and American 3,
which lay down the rule of construction applied by the court in
this case to the effect that a limitation of dying under age or without issue should be construed as under age and without issue. This
rule is based on the theory that the testator intended to benefit the
issue of the devisee and would not want this benefit to depend on
the single condition of the devisee reaching twenty-ond and at
the same time would not want the devisee to be required to have
issue to be able to take when he reaches twenty-one. This rule
has been applied, however, only in the case of a devise of a fee
simple absolute.
In the'case of a devise of a fee tail, subject to the limitation
of the devisee reaching twenty-one or having issue, the same rea1119 W. Va. 268, 193 S. E. 338 (1937).
2 Soulle v. Gerrard, Cro. Eliz. 525, 78 Eng. Rep. R. 773 (1595); Framlingham v. Brand, 3 Atk. 390, 26 Eng. Rep. R. 1024 (1746) ; Price v. Hunt, Pollex.
645, 86 Eng. Rep. R. 674 (1696); Barker v. Suretees, 2 Strange 1175, 93
Eng. Rep. R. 1109 (1743).
8 Williams v. Ricks, 182 N. C. 112, 108 S. E. 394 (1921); Note (1910)
25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1156, citing Brewer v. Opie, 1 Call 212 (Va. 1798).
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